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Abstract	  
Although autobiographical memory and episodic simulations recruit similar core brain regions, 
episodic simulations engage additional neural recruitment in the frontoparietal control network 
due to greater demands on constructive processes. However, previous functional neuroimaging 
studies showing differences in remembering and episodic simulation have focused on veridical 
retrieval of past experiences, and thus have not fully considered how retrieving the past in 
different ways from how it was originally experienced may also place similar demands on 
constructive processes. Here we examined how alternative versions of the past are constructed 
when adopting different egocentric perspectives during autobiographical memory retrieval 
compared to simulating hypothetical events from the personal past that could have occurred, or 
episodic counterfactual thinking. Participants were asked to generate titles for specific 
autobiographical memories from the last five years, and then, during functional magnetic 
resonance (fMRI) scanning, were asked to repeatedly retrieve autobiographical memories or 
imagine counterfactual events cued by the titles. We used an fMRI adaptation paradigm in order 
to isolate neural regions that were sensitive to adopting alternative egocentric perspectives and 
counterfactual simulations of the personal past. The fMRI results revealed that voxels within left 
posterior inferior parietal and ventrolateral frontal cortices were sensitive to novel visual 
perspectives and counterfactual simulations. Our findings suggest that the neural regions 
supporting remembering become more similar to those underlying episodic simulation when we 
adopt alternative egocentric perspectives of the veridical past.  
	   	  
 3	  
1.1	  Introduction	  Remembering	  the	  personal	  past,	  or	  autobiographical	  memory	  (AM),	  is	  closely	  related	  to	  our	  ability	  to	  imagine	  hypothetical	  episodes	  that	  might	  occur	  in	  the	  future	  (i.e.,	  
episodic	  simulation;	  Schacter	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Szpunar	  et	  al.,	  2014)	  or	  how	  events	  could	  have	  turned	  out	  differently	  in	  the	  past	  (i.e.,	  episodic	  counterfactual	  simulation;	  De	  Brigard	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  According	  to	  the	  constructive	  episodic	  simulation	  hypothesis	  (Schacter	  &	  Addis,	  2007,	  2009)	  both	  remembering	  and	  imagining	  are	  supported	  by	  a	  constructive	  episodic	  memory	  system	  that	  involves	  access	  to	  stored	  episodic	  details	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  flexibly	  recombine	  details	  from	  past	  episodes	  when	  memories	  are	  reconstructed	  or	  when	  imagining	  a	  hypothetical	  event.	  Supporting	  this	  hypothesis,	  AM	  retrieval	  and	  episodic	  simulation	  recruit	  a	  similar	  pattern	  of	  brain	  regions	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  core	  network,	  which	  includes	  medial	  temporal	  lobe,	  medial	  prefrontal	  cortex	  (PFC),	  posterior	  cingulate,	  retrosplenial	  cortex,	  and	  lateral	  temporal	  and	  parietal	  cortices	  (Addis	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Benoit	  &	  Schacter,	  2015;	  Buckner	  &	  Carroll,	  2007;	  Schacter	  et	  al.,	  2015;	  Spreng	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Szpunar	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  Episodic	  simulation,	  however,	  typically	  involves	  stronger	  neural	  recruitment	  in	  some	  of	  these	  core	  network	  areas,	  as	  well	  as	  additional	  recruitment	  of	  other	  brain	  regions	  attributed	  to	  greater	  constructive	  demands	  in	  recombining	  details	  when	  imagining	  a	  novel	  event	  (Benoit	  &	  Schacter,	  2015;	  Schacter	  &	  Addis,	  2009;	  Schacter,	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  We	  and	  others	  (Hardt	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Howe	  &	  Derbish,	  2010;	  Newman	  &	  Lindsay,	  2009;	  Schacter,	  2012;	  Schacter	  &	  Addis,	  2007;	  Schacter	  et	  al.,	  2011)	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  adaptive	  nature	  of	  memory,	  which	  enables	  the	  ability	  to	  simulate	  novel	  events,	  also	  makes	  it	  vulnerable	  to	  modification	  (e.g.,	  Carpenter	  &	  Schacter,	  2017;	  St	  Jacques	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  St	  Jacques	  &	  Schacter,	  2013;	  St	  Jacques	  et	  al.,	  2017).	  	  Yet,	  to	  our	  knowledge,	  previous	  functional	  neuroimaging	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studies	  have	  not	  fully	  considered	  how	  reshaping	  the	  veridical	  past	  may	  also	  place	  similar	  demands	  on	  constructive	  processes	  as	  episodic	  simulation	  of	  hypothetical	  events.	  Here,	  we	  used	  an	  fMRI	  adaptation	  paradigm	  (Barron	  et	  al.,	  2016;	  Grill-­‐Spector	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  Larsson	  et	  al.,	  2016;	  Szpunar	  et	  al.,	  2014)	  to	  isolate	  neural	  regions	  sensitive	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  alternative	  versions	  of	  the	  past	  during	  AM	  retrieval	  when	  adopting	  novel	  visual	  perspectives	  and	  episodic	  counterfactual	  simulations.	  As	  noted	  above,	  episodic	  simulation	  typically	  involves	  greater	  neural	  recruitment	  than	  AM	  retrieval.	  For	  example,	  some	  studies	  have	  shown	  greater	  recruitment	  of	  the	  hippocampus	  when	  imagining	  future	  events	  (Schacter	  &	  Addis,	  2009;	  Schacter	  et	  al.,	  2017),	  and	  stronger	  coupling	  with	  the	  frontoparietal	  control	  network	  when	  planning	  plausible	  future	  events	  (Gerlach	  et	  al.,	  2014;	  Spreng	  et	  al.	  2010).	  Although	  episodic	  simulations	  of	  the	  future	  and	  the	  past	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  recruit	  similar	  core	  network	  regions	  (e.g.,	  Addis	  et	  al.,	  2009),	  there	  are	  some	  reported	  differences.	  For	  example,	  episodic	  counterfactual	  thinking	  preferentially	  engages	  posterior	  dorsal	  medial	  PFC	  (Van	  Hoeck,	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  Further,	  De	  Brigard	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  found	  that	  probable	  or	  likely	  episodic	  counterfactual	  simulations,	  in	  contrast	  to	  unlikely	  episodic	  counterfactual	  simulations,	  recruited	  a	  more	  similar	  pattern	  of	  neural	  activity	  to	  that	  associated	  with	  AM	  retrieval.	  A	  recent	  meta-­‐analysis	  by	  Benoit	  &	  Schacter	  (2015)	  revealed	  that	  episodic	  simulations,	  including	  counterfactual	  thinking,	  involved	  greater	  engagement	  of	  core	  network	  areas	  than	  AM	  retrieval	  within	  the	  left	  inferior	  parietal	  cortex,	  dorsolateral	  PFC	  and	  hippocampus,	  as	  well	  as	  additional	  recruitment	  of	  precuneus	  and	  other	  brain	  regions	  overlapping	  with	  the	  frontoparietal	  control	  network.	  Such	  differences	  in	  the	  neural	  regions	  between	  episodic	  simulation	  and	  AM	  retrieval	  are	  thought	  to	  reflect	  additional	  constructive	  demands	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involved	  in	  recombining	  disparate	  episodic	  details	  to	  form	  novel	  coherent	  scenarios	  (for	  discussion	  see	  Schacter	  &	  Addis,	  2009;	  Schacter,	  et	  al.,	  2017;	  Schacter,	  et	  al.,	  2015).	  Importantly,	  however,	  previous	  research	  comparing	  episodic	  simulation	  and	  memory	  retrieval	  has	  focused	  on	  AM	  conditions	  that	  placed	  minimal	  demands	  on	  constructive	  processes.	  For	  example,	  participants	  are	  typically	  instructed	  to	  recall	  memories	  in	  accurate	  detail	  and/or	  in	  similar	  ways	  to	  which	  they	  were	  originally	  experienced.	  It	  is	  well	  known	  that	  AMs	  can	  be	  reconstructed	  in	  multiple	  ways	  (Hirst	  &	  Echterhoff,	  2012;	  Marsh,	  2007;	  Pasupathi,	  2001).	  Yet	  it	  is	  not	  well	  understood	  how	  the	  different	  ways	  we	  can	  retrieve	  memories	  influence	  the	  neural	  mechanisms	  typically	  associated	  with	  additional	  recombination	  demands	  during	  episodic	  simulation.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  ways	  we	  reconstruct	  AMs	  is	  by	  retrieving	  them	  from	  multiple	  egocentric	  or	  self-­‐centered	  visual	  perspectives.	  Although	  we	  typically	  experience	  the	  world	  from	  our	  own	  eyes,	  when	  we	  retrieve	  AMs	  we	  can	  flexibly	  shift	  our	  first	  person	  viewpoint	  from	  inside	  to	  outside	  the	  body,	  seeing	  ourselves	  in	  the	  memory	  (Nigro	  &	  Neisser,	  1983;	  Rice	  &	  Rubin,	  2009).	  Retrieving	  AMs	  from	  visual	  perspectives	  that	  were	  never	  experienced	  is	  thought	  to	  reflect	  reconstructive	  processes	  that	  can	  reshape	  memories	  (Butler	  et	  al.,	  2016;	  McDermott	  et	  al.,	  2016;	  Robinson	  &	  Swanson,	  1993).	  Supporting	  this	  idea,	  adopting	  a	  particular	  visual	  perspective	  influences	  the	  content	  and	  phenomenological	  properties	  of	  AM	  retrieval	  (Berntsen	  &	  Rubin,	  2006;	  McIsaac	  &	  Eich,	  2002;	  Robinson	  &	  Swanson,	  1993)	  and	  recruits	  different	  neural	  processes	  (Eich	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Freton,	  et	  al.,	  2014;	  Grol	  et	  al.,	  2017).	  We	  recently	  provided	  evidence	  concerning	  the	  neural	  mechanisms	  that	  contribute	  to	  changes	  in	  memories	  online	  and	  during	  subsequent	  memory	  retrieval	  when	  retrieving	  AMs	  from	  novel	  visual	  perspectives	  (St	  Jacques,	  et	  al.,	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In	  total,	  there	  were	  39	  participants	  who	  gave	  written	  informed	  consent.	  Two	  participants	  were	  excluded	  due	  to	  technical	  issues.	  Additionally,	  eight	  participants	  were	  excluded	  from	  the	  analysis	  because	  of	  excessive	  movement	  during	  fMRI	  scanning	  (i.e.,	  maximum	  absolute	  movements	  greater	  than	  2	  mm,	  more	  than	  5	  movements	  greater	  than	  0.5	  mm,	  and/or	  a	  slice	  signal-­‐to-­‐noise	  ratio	  less	  than	  99).1	  Thus,	  the	  final	  results	  were	  based	  on	  29	  participants	  (16	  women,	  Mean	  Age	  in	  Years	  =	  21.3,	  SD	  =	  3.4).	  
2.1.2.	  Procedure	  The	  study	  took	  place	  across	  two	  sessions	  separated	  by	  approximately	  a	  week	  (M	  =	  7.0	  days,	  SD	  =	  2.1).	  In	  session	  1,	  participants	  generated	  228	  memories	  and	  provided	  a	  unique	  event	  title	  and	  specific	  date.	  They	  were	  also	  asked	  to	  provide	  subjective	  ratings	  of	  reliving,	  own	  eyes	  perspective,	  observer	  perspective,	  emotional	  intensity,	  positive	  valence,	  and	  rehearsal	  each	  on	  7-­‐point	  scales	  from	  1	  =	  low	  to	  7	  =	  high.	  In	  order	  to	  minimize	  demands	  to	  shift	  visual	  perspective	  across	  the	  study	  sessions	  (e.g.,	  St	  Jacques,	  et	  al.,	  2017),	  we	  selected	  192	  memories	  that	  were	  associated	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  own	  eyes	  and	  observer	  perspective	  ratings.	  Memories	  were	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  autobiographical	  memory	  and	  episodic	  counterfactual	  simulation	  conditions	  that	  were	  matched	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  phenomenological	  ratings	  (for	  means	  and	  SD	  see	  Table	  1).	  In	  session	  2,	  participants	  were	  presented	  with	  event	  titles	  and	  asked	  to	  retrieve	  memories	  again	  or	  to	  simulate	  a	  counterfactual	  episode	  by	  imagining	  an	  alternative	  way	  in	  which	  the	  same	  event	  could	  have	  occurred	  (see	  Fig.	  1A).	  In	  the	  counterfactual	  task,	  participants	  were	  additionally	  instructed	  that	  the	  simulation	  should	  entail	  a	  plausible	  alternative,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  maintain	  the	  positive	  or	  negative	  emotions	  associated	  with	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Based	  on	  parameters	  optimized	  for	  adults	  using	  the	  Siemens	  3-­‐Tesla	  MRI	  Scanner	  with	  a	  12	  channel	  head	  coil	  at	  Harvard	  University.	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actual	  event.	  	  For	  example,	  if	  the	  original	  event	  involved	  “the	  picnic	  was	  ruined	  when	  it	  
started	  to	  rain”	  participants	  were	  instructed	  to	  imagine	  instead	  that	  “the	  picnic	  was	  ruined	  
when	  a	  bunch	  of	  ants	  got	  in	  our	  food.”	  In	  both	  tasks,	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  think	  about	  the	  event	  from	  an	  own	  eyes	  or	  an	  observer	  perspective.	  Specifically,	  participants	  were	  instructed:	  “If	  the	  perspective	  is	  own	  eyes,	  mentally	  reinstate	  the	  event	  as	  if	  seeing	  it	  through	  your	  own	  eyes.	  If	  the	  perspective	  is	  observer,	  mentally	  reinstate	  the	  event	  as	  if	  viewing	  it	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  spectator	  or	  observer,	  watching	  yourself	  in	  the	  event.”	  Each	  event	  was	  presented	  for	  7.5	  s	  and	  was	  followed	  by	  emotional	  intensity	  and	  task	  difficulty	  ratings	  (on	  5-­‐point	  scales	  from	  1	  =	  low	  to	  5=high)	  for	  2.5	  s	  each,	  the	  order	  of	  which	  was	  counterbalanced	  across	  participants.	  Trials	  were	  separated	  by	  an	  active	  baseline	  consisting	  of	  a	  left/right	  decision	  that	  was	  variable	  in	  length	  (2.5	  –	  10	  s),	  distributed	  exponentially	  such	  that	  shorter	  inter-­‐trial	  intervals	  occurred	  more	  frequently	  than	  longer	  inter-­‐trial	  intervals.	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Fig.	  1.	  fMRI	  Design	  and	  trial	  structure.	  A)	  Participants	  were	  presented	  with	  the	  titles	  of	  autobiographical	  events	  they	  generated	  in	  a	  previous	  session	  and	  asked	  to	  retrieve	  the	  memory	  or	  simulate	  an	  episodic	  counterfactual	  event	  while	  adopting	  an	  own	  eyes	  or	  observer	  visual	  perspective,	  then	  to	  rate	  how	  difficult	  the	  task	  was,	  and	  the	  emotional	  intensity	  associated	  with	  the	  event.	  We	  used	  an	  active	  jittered	  baseline	  consisting	  of	  a	  left/right	  decision.	  B)	  Immediately	  prior	  to	  scanning	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  retrieve	  or	  simulate	  an	  episodic	  counterfactual	  event	  for	  two	  thirds	  of	  the	  autobiographical	  events,	  with	  two	  repetitions.	  During	  fMRI	  scanning,	  some	  of	  these	  events	  were	  shown	  for	  a	  third	  time	  with	  the	  same	  instruction	  (i.e.,	  identical	  repetition),	  with	  the	  instruction	  to	  adopt	  a	  novel	  visual	  perspective	  or	  episodic	  counterfactual	  simulation	  (i.e.,	  novel	  repetition).	  The	  other	  third	  of	  the	  autobiographical	  events	  were	  shown	  for	  the	  first	  time	  during	  fMRI	  scanning	  (i.e.,	  initial	  trial).	  	  In	  order	  to	  examine	  fMRI	  repetition	  suppression	  effects,	  two	  thirds	  of	  events	  had	  been	  shown	  twice	  outside	  the	  scanner	  before	  being	  shown	  for	  the	  third	  time	  during	  fMRI	  scanning,	  whereas	  the	  remaining	  third	  of	  events	  were	  shown	  for	  the	  first	  time	  during	  scanning	  (see	  Fig.	  1B).	  In	  previous	  research	  we	  have	  observed	  similar	  repetition	  suppression	  effects	  irrespective	  of	  whether	  trials	  are	  repeated	  within	  the	  same	  fMRI	  run	  or	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not	  (Szpunar	  et	  al.,	  2015),	  and	  we	  expected	  to	  find	  the	  same	  robust	  effects	  here.	  For	  the	  repeated	  trials,	  one	  half	  were	  identical	  repetitions,	  whereas	  the	  other	  half	  were	  novel	  repetitions.	  For	  identical	  repetitions,	  participants	  were	  instructed	  to	  retrieve	  or	  simulate	  the	  counterfactual	  of	  the	  event	  in	  the	  same	  way,	  while	  holding	  the	  visual	  perspective	  constant.	  For	  novel	  repetitions,	  we	  manipulated	  whether	  participants	  remembered	  or	  imagined	  alternative	  versions	  of	  the	  past.	  Specifically,	  in	  the	  novel	  perspective	  condition,	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  adopt	  a	  different	  visual	  perspective	  compared	  to	  the	  previous	  two	  memory	  retrieval	  trials	  (i.e.,	  memories	  were	  retrieved	  from	  an	  own	  eyes	  perspective	  on	  each	  of	  the	  first	  two	  trials	  and	  then	  retrieved	  from	  an	  observer	  perspective	  on	  the	  third	  trial,	  or	  vice	  versa).	  In	  the	  novel	  counterfactual	  condition,	  visual	  perspective	  was	  maintained	  but	  participants	  were	  instead	  asked	  to	  adopt	  a	  novel	  episodic	  counterfactual	  simulation	  of	  the	  memory	  (i.e.,	  memories	  were	  retrieved	  on	  each	  of	  the	  first	  two	  trials	  and	  then	  a	  novel	  episodic	  counterfactual	  simulation	  was	  constructed	  on	  the	  third	  trial).	  Thus,	  the	  novel	  perspective	  and	  novel	  counterfactual	  conditions	  allowed	  us	  to	  isolate	  the	  neural	  regions	  that	  support	  the	  ability	  to	  construct	  alternative	  versions	  of	  the	  personal	  past.	  There	  were	  four	  functional	  runs	  of	  the	  task	  with	  48	  trials	  each,	  for	  a	  total	  of	  16	  trials	  per	  trial	  type.	  	  
2.1.2.1.	  fMRI	  Data	  Acquisition	  and	  Pre-­‐Processing	  Imaging	  was	  conducted	  on	  a	  3T	  Siemens	  Magnetom	  TimTrio	  Scanner,	  equipped	  with	  a	  12-­‐channel	  head	  coil	  at	  the	  Center	  for	  Brain	  Science	  at	  Harvard	  University.	  A	  laptop	  computer	  running	  Eprime	  1.0	  software	  (Psychology	  Software	  Tools,	  Pittsburg,	  PA)	  controlled	  stimulus	  display	  via	  an	  LCD	  projector,	  which	  projected	  onto	  a	  screen	  placed	  at	  the	  head	  of	  the	  MRI	  bore.	  Participants	  viewed	  the	  screen	  through	  a	  mirror	  fastened	  to	  the	  head	  coil.	  Cushions	  were	  used	  to	  minimize	  head	  movement	  and	  earplugs	  dampened	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scanner	  noise.	  Participants	  made	  responses	  using	  a	  five-­‐button	  box	  placed	  in	  their	  right	  hand.	   Anatomical	  images	  were	  acquired	  using	  a	  high-­‐resolution	  three-­‐dimensional	  magnetization-­‐prepared	  rapid	  gradient	  echo	  sequence	  (MPRAGE;	  176	  sagittal	  slices,	  echo	  time	  (TE)	  =	  1.64	  ms,	  repetition	  time	  (TR)	  =	  2,530	  ms,	  flip	  angle	  =	  7	  degrees,	  voxel	  size	  =	  1	  x	  1	  x	  1	  mm).	  Functional	  images	  were	  collected	  using	  a	  T2*	  gradient	  echo,	  echo-­‐planar	  imaging	  (EPI)	  sequence	  sensitive	  to	  blood	  oxygen	  level-­‐dependent	  (BOLD)	  contrast	  (TR	  =	  2,500	  ms,	  TE	  =	  25	  ms,	  flip	  angle	  =	  85	  degrees,	  3	  x	  3	  mm	  in-­‐plane	  resolution).	  Whole-­‐brain	  coverage	  was	  obtained	  with	  41	  contiguous	  slices,	  acquired	  in	  the	  oblique	  coronal	  orientation.	  An	  online	  correction	  for	  distortion	  in	  the	  EPI	  images	  was	  conducted	  by	  acquiring	  two	  EPI	  images	  pre-­‐scan	  with	  phase-­‐encoding	  gradients	  in	  opposite	  directions	  and	  then	  computing	  a	  displacement	  map	  correcting	  the	  distortion	  in	  each	  voxel.	  Following	  the	  functional	  runs,	  we	  included	  a	  6	  min	  12	  sec	  resting	  state	  scan	  in	  which	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  keep	  their	  eyes	  open	  while	  fixating	  on	  a	  crosshair	  as	  part	  of	  our	  standard	  protocol	  for	  an	  analysis	  that	  was	  not	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  current	  study.	  Imaging	  data	  were	  preprocessed	  and	  statistically	  analyzed	  using	  SPM8	  (Wellcome	  Department	  of	  Imaging	  Neuroscience,	  London,	  UK).	  First,	  data	  were	  preprocessed	  to	  remove	  sources	  of	  noise	  and	  artifact.	  Preprocessing	  included	  slice-­‐time	  correction	  to	  correct	  for	  differences	  in	  acquisition	  time	  between	  slices	  for	  each	  whole	  brain	  volume;	  realignment	  within	  and	  across	  runs	  to	  correct	  for	  head	  movement;	  spatial	  normalization	  to	  the	  Montreal	  Neurological	  Institute	  (MNI)	  template	  (resampled	  at	  2	  x	  2	  x	  2	  mm	  voxels);	  and	  spatial	  smoothing	  at	  8	  mm	  full	  width	  at	  half	  maximum	  (FWHM)	  using	  a	  Gaussian	  kernel.	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2.1.2.2.	  fMRI	  Analysis	  	  Fixed	  effects	  analyses	  included	  regressors	  at	  the	  onset	  of	  each	  event	  title	  in	  each	  condition,	  which	  were	  modeled	  with	  a	  canonical	  hemodynamic	  response	  function	  with	  a	  duration	  of	  7.5	  s.	  An	  additional	  regressor	  of	  no	  interest	  was	  included	  at	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  first	  rating	  with	  a	  duration	  of	  5	  s	  (i.e.,	  the	  total	  length	  of	  the	  two	  ratings).	  A	  general	  linear	  model	  was	  then	  used	  to	  examine	  random	  effects.	  	  To	  examine	  repetition	  suppression	  effects,	  we	  first	  compared	  the	  linear	  reduction	  in	  the	  blood	  oxygen	  level	  dependent	  (BOLD)	  response	  across	  identical	  repetitions	  of	  memory	  retrieval,	  or	  the	  basic	  repetition	  suppression	  effect	  (i.e.,	  Initial	  Retrieval	  –	  Identical	  Retrieval	  Repetition).	  Next,	  we	  used	  an	  fMRI	  adaptation	  approach	  to	  isolate	  regions	  within	  this	  retrieval	  network	  that	  were	  associated	  with	  constructing	  alternative	  versions	  of	  the	  past.	  We	  did	  this	  by	  examining	  the	  linear	  rebound	  in	  the	  BOLD	  response	  when	  an	  event	  was	  altered	  on	  repeated	  trials,	  by	  adopting	  a	  novel	  visual	  perspective	  or	  a	  novel	  counterfactual	  simulation	  of	  the	  event,	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  identical	  repeated	  retrieval	  of	  memories	  (i.e.,	  Novel	  Repetition	  –	  Identical	  Retrieval	  Repetition).	  A	  conjunction	  approach	  was	  then	  used	  to	  isolate	  neural	  regions	  showing	  both	  the	  linear	  reduction	  in	  the	  BOLD	  response	  across	  identical	  repetitions	  and	  the	  linear	  rebound	  when	  an	  event	  was	  altered.	  To	  examine	  potential	  differences	  in	  the	  neural	  representations	  supporting	  the	  construction	  of	  alternative	  versions	  of	  the	  past	  we	  directly	  compared	  fMRI	  adaptation	  effects	  in	  the	  novel	  perspective	  and	  novel	  counterfactual	  conditions	  and	  their	  interaction	  with	  visual	  perspective	  using	  an	  ANOVA	  approach.	  Additionally,	  we	  conducted	  a	  parametric	  modulation	  analysis	  to	  examine	  neural	  recruitment	  that	  correlated	  with	  trial-­‐by-­‐trial	  variation	  in	  difficulty,	  separately	  within	  the	  AM	  retrieval	  and	  episodic	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counterfactual	  simulation	  tasks.	  	  A	  whole-­‐brain	  analysis	  with	  a	  primary	  voxel-­‐level	  threshold	  of	  P	  =	  .001	  and	  a	  minimum	  cluster-­‐extent	  threshold	  of	  k	  ≥	  61	  voxels	  was	  used	  to	  correct	  for	  multiple	  comparisons	  at	  p	  <	  .05	  as	  determined	  by	  10000	  Monte	  Carlo	  simulations	  (Slotnick,	  Moo,	  Segal,	  &	  Hart	  Jr,	  2003).	  To	  minimize	  potential	  false	  positives	  with	  using	  cluster	  thresholding	  we	  incorporated	  the	  correct	  smoothing	  value	  (i.e.	  derived	  from	  the	  average	  FWHM	  value	  calculated	  from	  the	  group-­‐analysis	  in	  SPM	  =	  14.1)	  and	  used	  a	  conservative	  primary	  voxel-­‐level	  threshold	  (Eklund	  et	  al.,	  2016;	  Woo	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  
2.1.2.3.	  Region	  of	  Interest	  (ROI)	  Analysis	  We	  also	  conducted	  a	  targeted	  ROI	  analysis	  based	  on	  the	  fMRI	  results	  from	  a	  previous	  paper	  in	  which	  we	  found	  engagement	  of	  central	  precuneus	  when	  altering	  the	  visual	  perspective	  of	  AMs	  during	  retrieval	  (St	  Jacques,	  et	  al.,	  2016).	  Percent	  signal	  change	  was	  calculated	  on	  a	  6	  mm	  sphere	  centered	  on	  the	  peak	  voxel	  in	  the	  central	  precuneus	  (MNI:	  0,	  -­‐60,	  44)	  using	  MarsBaR.	  A	  3	  (Trial:	  Initial	  Trial,	  Identical	  Repeated,	  Novel	  Perspective)	  x	  2	  (Visual	  Perspective:	  Own	  Eyes,	  Observer)	  repeated	  measures	  ANOVA	  was	  then	  used	  to	  examine	  the	  pattern	  of	  percent	  signal	  change	  in	  the	  central	  precuneus.	  Follow-­‐up	  analyses	  employed	  one-­‐tailed	  paired	  t-­‐tests	  to	  test	  the	  predicted	  direction	  of	  the	  trial	  level	  effects	  (i.e.,	  initial	  trial	  >	  identical	  repeated,	  novel	  perspective	  >	  identical	  repeated).	  
Results	  
Behavioral	  Results.	  There	  were	  no	  differences	  in	  the	  subjective	  ratings	  of	  memories	  assigned	  to	  the	  autobiographical	  retrieval	  or	  episodic	  counterfactual	  simulation	  conditions	  (for	  means	  and	  SD	  see	  Table	  1).	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Table	  1.	  Session	  1	  Ratings	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   Memories	  Randomly	  Assigned	  to	  Two	  Tasks:	  
	  	  




Simulation	  	  	  
Reliving	   4.50	  (0.70)	   4.47	  (0.70)	  
Own	  Eyes	   5.17	  (1.22)	   5.18	  (1.22)	  
Observer	   2.85	  (1.19)	   2.85	  (1.21)	  
Emotional	  
Intensity	   3.99	  (0.87)	   4.01	  (0.80)	  
Positive	  Valence	   4.63	  (0.42)	   4.59	  (0.40)	  
Rehearsal	   2.76	  (0.57)	   2.76	  (0.52)	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Mean	  (Standard	  Deviation)	   	  	   	  	   	  	  	  	   To	  examine	  subjective	  ratings	  and	  reaction	  times	  during	  session	  2,	  we	  conducted	  a	  2	  (Visual	  Perspective:	  Own	  Eyes,	  Observer)	  x	  2	  (Task:	  Retrieval,	  Simulation)	  x	  3	  (Trial:	  Initial,	  Identical	  Repetition,	  Novel	  Repetition)	  repeated	  measures	  ANOVA,	  separately	  for	  difficulty	  and	  emotional	  intensity	  ratings	  (for	  means	  and	  SD	  see	  Table	  2).	  First,	  turning	  to	  difficulty	  rating	  responses,	  we	  found	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  task,	  F	  (1,	  28)	  =	  49.85,	  p	  <	  .001,	  
ηp2=	  .64.	  Inspection	  of	  the	  means	  revealed	  that	  it	  was	  more	  difficult	  to	  construct	  simulations	  (M	  =	  2.57,	  SD	  =	  0.68),	  than	  to	  retrieve	  memories	  (M	  =	  1.85,	  SD	  =	  0.44).	  There	  was	  also	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  visual	  perspective,	  F	  (1,	  28)	  =	  9.38,	  p	  =	  .005,	  ηp2	  =	  .25,	  which	  was	  reflected	  by	  greater	  difficulty	  when	  adopting	  an	  observer	  (M	  =	  2.32,	  SD	  =	  0.59),	  than	  an	  own	  eyes	  perspective	  (M	  =	  2.10,	  SD	  =	  0.48).	  There	  were	  no	  other	  main	  effects	  or	  interactions,	  nor	  differences	  in	  reaction	  time	  to	  make	  difficulty	  ratings.	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Table	  2.	  Session	  2	  Ratings	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   Difficulty	   Emotional	  Intensity	  
	  	   Response	   RT	   Response	   RT	  
Autobiographical	  Memory	  
Retrieval	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Intial	  Trial	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Own	  Eyes	   1.70	  (0.54)	   0.95	  (0.32)	   3.15	  (0.68)	   0.93	  (0.28)	  
Observer	   2.01	  (0.62)	   0.95	  (0.31)	   3.00	  (0.78)	   0.93	  (0.26)	  
Identical	  Repetition	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Own	  Eyes	   1.76	  (0.50)	   0.93	  (0.27)	   2.95	  (0.59)	   0.89	  (0.23)	  
Observer	   1.92	  (0.55)	   0.95	  (0.29)	   2.82	  (0.67)	   0.94	  (0.29)	  
Novel	  Repetition	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Own	  Eyes	   1.72	  (0.52)	   0.94	  (0.31)	   2.94	  (0.62)	   0.89	  (0.28)	  
Observer	   1.97	  (0.56)	   0.96	  (0.31)	   2.94	  (0.65)	   0.93	  (0.27)	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Episodic	  Counterfactual	  Simulation	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Intial	  Trial	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Own	  Eyes	   2.56	  (0.67)	   1.03	  (0.26)	   2.88	  (0.59)	   1.06	  (0.29)	  
Observer	   2.64	  (0.77)	   1.01	  (0.27)	   2.88	  (0.57)	   1.08	  (0.29)	  
Identical	  Repetition	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Own	  Eyes	   2.41	  (0.72)	   0.95	  (0.26)	   2.75	  (0.59)	   0.99	  (0.27)	  
Observer	   2.62	  (0.77)	   0.95	  (0.24)	   2.74	  (0.64)	   1.00	  (0.28)	  
Novel	  Repetition	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Own	  Eyes	   2.47	  (0.68)	   0.98	  (0.26)	   2.79	  (0.49)	   1.00	  (0.32)	  
Observer	   2.73	  (0.82)	   0.96	  (0.25)	   2.73	  (0.59)	   1.03	  (0.30)	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Mean	  (Standard	  Deviation)	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  	   Turning	  to	  emotional	  intensity,	  there	  was	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  task,	  F	  (1,	  28)	  =	  8.95,	  p	  =	  .006,	  ηp2	  =	  .24,	  which	  was	  reflected	  by	  higher	  ratings	  during	  autobiographical	  memory	  retrieval	  (M	  =	  2.97,	  SD	  =	  0.61),	  compared	  to	  episodic	  counterfactual	  simulation	  (M	  =	  2.80,	  
SD	  =	  0.53).	  There	  was	  also	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  repetition	  trial,	  F	  (2,	  56)	  =	  9.32,	  p	  <	  .001,	  ηp2	  =	  .25.	  Follow-­‐up	  tests	  revealed	  that	  emotional	  intensity	  was	  higher	  on	  initial	  trials	  (M	  =	  2.98,	  SD	  =	  0.61),	  when	  compared	  to	  identical	  repetitions	  (M	  =	  2.82,	  SD	  =	  0.55),	  and	  novel	  repetitions	  (M	  =	  2.85,	  SD	  =	  0.53),	  both	  p’s	  <	  .01.	  There	  were	  no	  other	  main	  effects	  or	  interactions.	  However,	  there	  were	  differences	  between	  the	  tasks	  in	  reaction	  times	  to	  make	  emotional	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intensity	  ratings,	  F	  (1,	  28)	  =	  15.93,	  p	  <	  .001,	  ηp2	  =	  .36,	  which	  reflected	  slower	  reaction	  times	  to	  make	  emotional	  intensity	  ratings	  for	  episodic	  counterfactual	  simulations	  (M	  =	  1.03,	  SD	  =	  0.26),	  compared	  to	  autobiographical	  memory	  retrieval	  (M	  =	  0.92,	  SD	  =	  0.25).	  	  The	  behavioral	  findings	  from	  session	  2	  suggest	  that	  episodic	  counterfactual	  simulation	  was	  a	  more	  difficult	  task	  and	  associated	  with	  less	  emotional	  intensity	  when	  compared	  to	  autobiographical	  memory	  retrieval.	  There	  were	  also	  differences	  in	  difficulty	  when	  adopting	  a	  particular	  visual	  perspective,	  and	  between	  autobiographical	  and	  counterfactual	  tasks,	  however,	  critically	  there	  were	  no	  interactions.	  




Fig.	  2.	  Neural	  regions	  that	  differed	  during	  episodic	  counterfactual	  simulations	  (CF)	  and	  AM	  retrieval,	  when	  averaged	  across	  identical	  repetitions.	  	  
Table 3. Comparison of AM Retrieval and Episodic Counterfactual 
Simulation 
  
       
  	   	   MNI Peak  
Region Voxels ~ BA t x y z 
AM Retrieval > Episodic Counterfactual Simulation 
vmPFC 156 10 3.71 -10 28 -10 
   3.57 -16 44 -6 
     inc. Anterior Cingulate Cortex 10/32 3.71 -10 32 0 
Posterior Inferior Parietal Cortex 164 40 4.62 -64 -30 38 
   3.93 -60 -28 24 
 234 40 4.16 54 -28 32 
   3.23 66 -24 22 
Episodic Counterfactual Simulation > AM Retrieval 
Lateral PFC, inc. Posterior dlPFC 8924 6,8 7.93 -40 8 48 
     Posterior dmPFC  9 7.14 -8 30 48 
  8 6.96 -6 20 54 
     dlPFC  9 6.77 -42 26 42 
     vlPFC  45 6.39 -56 18 12 
Posterior dlPFC 1363 8 5.76 38 12 46 
  9 5.05 42 30 40 
     inc vlPFC  44 4.04 56 22 20 
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Insular Cortex 141 13 3.90 32 22 0 
Temporal Cortex 147 21 4.76 62 -38 -6 
Posterior Inferior Parietal Cortex 3091 39 8.41 -42 -62 46 
 1234 39 5.81 48 -58 46 
Posterior Precuneus 117 7 4.13 -4 -68 38 
Fusiform Cortex 1441 37 6.49 -58 -44 -6 
     inc. Temporal Cortex  21 6.28 -48 -34 -2 
Visual Cortex 6709 18 8.16 2 -86 -2 
  18 6.33 -12 -84 -12 
     inc. Cerebellum  - 5.97 34 -60 -30 
Thalamus 64 50 3.68 -12 -6 4 
MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute; BA= Brodmann's Area;  PFC = Prefrontal Cortex;  
dl = Dorsolateral; dm = Dorsomedial; vl = Ventrolateral; vm = Ventromedial 	  The	  behavioral	  results	  indicated	  that	  subjective	  ratings	  of	  difficulty	  were	  higher	  for	  the	  counterfactual	  than	  the	  AM	  task.	  To	  examine	  whether	  subjective	  difficulty	  contributed	  to	  differences	  in	  neural	  recruitment,	  we	  conducted	  an	  additional	  parametric	  modulation	  analysis	  that	  examined	  regions	  that	  were	  sensitive	  to	  trial-­‐by-­‐trial	  variation	  in	  subjective	  ratings	  of	  difficulty,	  separately	  within	  each	  task.	  There	  were	  no	  regions	  that	  tracked	  with	  difficulty	  in	  the	  AM	  retrieval	  task.	  In	  the	  episodic	  counterfactual	  simulation	  task,	  there	  was	  greater	  engagement	  of	  left	  visual	  cortex	  on	  trials	  that	  were	  rated	  higher	  on	  difficulty	  (~BA	  =	  18;	  MNI	  =	  -­‐22,	  -­‐94,	  -­‐10;	  t	  =	  4.75;	  voxels	  =	  106),	  but	  little	  to	  no	  overlap	  with	  the	  regions	  that	  were	  recruited	  more	  during	  the	  counterfactual	  than	  AM	  task.	  Additionally,	  targeted	  ROI	  analyses	  showed	  that	  none	  of	  the	  brain	  regions	  that	  differed	  between	  the	  counterfactual	  and	  AM	  tasks	  were	  engaged	  more	  on	  trials	  with	  higher	  subjective	  ratings	  of	  difficulty	  (see	  Supplemental	  Fig.	  1).	  In	  sum,	  these	  findings	  demonstrate	  that	  behavioral	  differences	  in	  subjective	  ratings	  of	  difficulty	  cannot	  account	  for	  the	  neural	  differences	  between	  the	  episodic	  counterfactual	  simulation	  and	  AM	  retrieval	  tasks	  found	  here.	  	  
3.1.3.	  Whole-­‐Brain	  Analysis:	  Constructing	  Alternative	  Versions	  of	  the	  Past	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The	  main	  goal	  of	  the	  paper	  was	  to	  isolate	  neural	  regions	  that	  support	  the	  ability	  to	  reconstruct	  alternative	  versions	  of	  the	  personal	  past	  when	  changing	  the	  visual	  perspective	  of	  memories	  or	  imagining	  an	  episodic	  counterfactual	  event.	  As	  a	  first	  step,	  we	  examined	  the	  neural	  representations	  associated	  with	  identical	  repetitions	  during	  autobiographical	  memory	  retrieval	  (i.e.,	  reduction	  in	  BOLD	  response	  from	  an	  initial	  retrieval	  to	  an	  identical	  retrieval	  repetition;	  see	  Fig.	  3	  and	  Table	  4).	  The	  analysis	  revealed	  repetition	  suppression	  effects	  in	  bilateral	  ventromedial	  and	  dorsomedial	  PFC,	  ventrolateral	  and	  dorsolateral	  PFC,	  lateral	  temporal	  cortices,	  inferior	  posterior	  parietal	  cortices,	  medial	  temporal	  lobe	  (including	  posterior	  parahippocampal	  cortex	  and	  hippocampus),	  posterior	  midline	  regions	  (including	  retrosplenial	  and	  posterior	  cingulate	  cortices),	  and	  cerebellum.	  This	  pattern	  of	  neural	  activity	  overlaps	  with	  default	  network	  and	  other	  regions	  that	  are	  frequently	  engaged	  during	  autobiographical	  memory	  retrieval	  (Addis	  et	  al.,	  2016;	  Andrews-­‐Hanna	  et	  al.,	  2014;	  St	  Jacques,	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  There	  were	  no	  regions	  where	  repetition	  suppression	  effects	  significantly	  differed	  when	  adopting	  an	  own	  eyes	  or	  observer	  perspective	  during	  autobiographical	  memory	  retrieval.	  Thus,	  the	  pattern	  of	  repetition	  suppression	  effects	  likely	  support	  general	  retrieval-­‐related	  processes	  irrespective	  of	  the	  particular	  visual	  perspective	  taken	  (also	  see	  St	  Jacques,	  et	  al.,	  2017).	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Fig.	  3.	  Neural	  regions	  that	  were	  sensitive	  to	  the	  basic	  repetition	  suppression	  effects	  (i.e.,	  reduction	  in	  BOLD	  response	  from	  initial	  trials	  to	  identical	  repetitions)	  during	  AM	  retrieval.	  
Table 4. AM Retrieval (Initial - Identical Retrieval Repetitions) 
  	   	   MNI Peak  
Region Voxel
s 
~ BA t x y z 
PFC, inc. vmPFC 8844 11 6.29 -2 48 -16 
     Posterior dmPFC  8 5.75 -10 42 42 
     vlPFC  45 6.09 -50 30 0 
  47 6.08 -52 38 -8 
   5.93 -32 24 -20 
     Posterior dlPFC  8/9 5.60 -42 10 46 
vlPFC 539 47 4.50 36 32 -14 
   4.10 26 18 -16 
   3.96 48 30 -6 
  45 4.24 54 26 16 
   3.97 56 30 0 
   3.64 58 24 8 
Posterior dmPFC 74 8 4.07 20 34 42 
Temporal Cortex 472 21 5.80 -60 -8 -18 
  20 3.31 -40 -14 -24 
 532 21 4.41 -60 -36 -2 
   4.22 -60 -34 -10 
   3.51 -60 -52 2 
 259 21 4.95 60 -4 -20 
Posterior Cingulate 4850 31 6.79 -4 -56 24 
 21	  
  23 4.30 -6 -42 34 
     inc. Hippocampus  - 4.18 -28 -26 -16 
Posterior Parahippocampal Cortex 30 5.52 -18 -38 -14 
  36 4.44 24 -34 -16 
Retrosplenial Cortex  29 4.87 14 -46 4 
Posterior Inferior Parietal Cortex 1575 39 5.88 -44 -74 32 
   5.34 -48 -62 24 
 360  4.62 48 -60 24 
Globus Pallidus 313 - 4.53 10 -2 -6 
   4.06 0 10 -8 
     inc. Thalamus  - 3.49 2 -12 0 
Cerebellum 976 - 5.23 18 -84 -36 
   4.90 24 -80 -30 
   4.61 14 -78 -28 
MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute; BA= Brodmann's Area;  PFC = Prefrontal Cortex;  
dl = Dorsolateral; dm = Dorsomedial; vl = Ventrolateral; vm = Ventromedial 	   Next,	  we	  examined	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  neural	  representations	  within	  these	  retrieval	  specific	  regions	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  alternative	  versions	  of	  the	  past	  when	  shifting	  to	  an	  alternative	  visual	  perspective	  during	  memory	  retrieval	  or	  creating	  a	  novel	  counterfactual	  simulation	  of	  the	  event	  (i.e.,	  reduction	  in	  BOLD	  response	  from	  a	  novel	  repetition	  to	  an	  identical	  retrieval	  repetition).	  If	  the	  underlying	  neural	  representation	  is	  insensitive	  to	  changes	  in	  visual	  perspective	  or	  counterfactual	  simulation,	  then	  the	  BOLD	  response	  will	  be	  reduced	  similarly	  to	  identical	  repetitions	  (i.e.,	  no	  difference	  in	  neural	  activation	  between	  novel	  repetitions	  and	  identical	  retrieval	  repetitions).	  However,	  if	  the	  neural	  representations	  are	  sensitive	  to	  changes	  related	  to	  visual	  perspective	  or	  counterfactual	  simulation,	  then	  the	  BOLD	  response	  will	  rebound	  to	  the	  same	  level	  as	  the	  initial	  trials	  (i.e.,	  difference	  in	  neural	  activation	  between	  novel	  repetitions	  and	  identical	  retrieval	  repetition).	  The	  fMRI	  adaptation	  findings	  revealed	  a	  number	  of	  regions	  that	  were	  sensitive	  to	  changes	  in	  both	  the	  visual	  perspective	  and	  counterfactual	  aspect	  of	  memories	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(see	  Table	  5).	  First,	  changing	  the	  visual	  perspective	  of	  memories	  revealed	  effects	  in	  bilateral	  ventromedial	  and	  posterior	  dorsomedial	  PFC,	  posterior	  inferior	  parietal,	  and	  posterior	  cingulate	  cortices,	  as	  well	  as	  left	  ventrolateral	  and	  dorsolateral	  PFC	  (see	  Fig.	  4A).	  Second,	  adopting	  a	  novel	  counterfactual	  simulation	  of	  a	  memory	  recruited	  similar	  regions	  including	  bilateral	  posterior	  dorsomedial	  PFC,	  ventrolateral	  and	  lateral	  temporal	  cortices,	  as	  well	  as	  left	  dorsolateral	  PFC,	  posterior	  inferior	  parietal	  and	  posterior	  cingulate	  cortices,	  and	  right	  cerebellum	  (see	  Fig.	  4B).	  A	  conjunction	  analysis	  directly	  comparing	  the	  fMRI	  adaptation	  effects	  in	  the	  novel	  perspective	  and	  novel	  counterfactual	  conditions	  revealed	  that	  there	  was	  overlap	  in	  voxels	  within	  the	  left	  posterior	  inferior	  parietal	  cortex,	  posterior	  dorsomedial	  PFC,	  ventrolateral	  PFC,	  and	  posterior	  dorsolateral	  PFC	  (see	  Fig.	  5).	  Further,	  each	  of	  these	  regions	  completely	  overlapped	  with	  neural	  recruitment	  that	  differed	  between	  episodic	  counterfactual	  and	  veridical	  retrieval	  of	  autobiographical	  memories,	  when	  reconstructive	  demands	  where	  minimized.	  Critically,	  a	  direct	  comparison	  showed	  that	  there	  were	  no	  regions	  where	  fMRI	  adaptation	  effects	  differed	  when	  adopting	  novel	  visual	  perspectives	  or	  novel	  counterfactual	  simulations,	  nor	  interactions	  with	  the	  particular	  visual	  perspective	  adopted.	  Thus,	  our	  findings	  demonstrate	  that	  altering	  memories	  when	  adopting	  a	  novel	  visual	  perspective	  recruits	  similar	  neural	  regions	  as	  those	  that	  enable	  simulation	  of	  counterfactual	  events.	  
Table 5. Regions Contributing to Constructing Alternative Versions of the Past 
    MNI Peak  
Region Voxels ~ BA t x y z 
Novel Visual Perspectives (Novel - Identical Retrieval Repetition) 
vlPFC 107 47 4.40 -52 38 -8 
 90 44 3.49 -52 16 30 
   3.45 -42 16 24 
vmPFC 390 11 4.08 0 38 -20 
  10 3.24 -6 62 -2 
 23	  
   3.23 -4 54 -8 
Posterior  dlPFC 142 6/8 4.13 -38 6 46 
Posterior dmPFC 527 8 4.03 -22 30 44 
   3.87 -16 30 52 
  9 3.56 0 48 48 
  8 3.47 -6 38 46 
   3.44 -10 46 46 
   3.42 -16 46 40 
 68 8 4.05 20 34 42 
Posterior Cingulate Cortex 592 31 4.08 -6 -56 28 
  23 4.13 20 -50 26 
   3.38 -10 -42 32 
Posterior Inferior Parietal Cortex 362 39 4.26 -40 -56 24 
   3.98 -40 -64 34 
 220 39 3.98 46 -62 28 
Novel Counterfactual Simulation (Novel  - Identical Retrieval Repetition) 
Lateral PFC inc. vlPFC 4794 47 5.39 -52 38 -8 
  44 5.00 -42 14 26 
     Posterior dlPFC  6/8 5.40 -42 10 46 
     Posterior dmPFC  8/9 5.27 -10 44 44 
   5.36 -6 22 56 
   4.87 -28 22 50 
vlPFC 65 47 3.59 46 28 -8 
   3.59 46 28 -8 
Posterior Inferior Parietal Cortex 535 39 4.67 -38 -66 36 
   4.36 -42 -60 28 
Temporal Cortex 352 21 4.35 -58 -36 -4 
Cerebellum 847 - 4.74 20 -80 -30 
   4.61 22 -86 -38 
   3.58 32 -78 -40 
Conjunction of Novel Visual Perspective and Novel Counterfactual Simulation 
vlPFC 107 47 4.33 -52 38 -8 
 90 44 3.46 -52 16 30 
   3.45 -42 16 24 
Posterior dlPFC 142 6/8 4.08 -38 6 46 
Posterior dmPFC 414 8 3.88 -24 28 46 
   3.87 -16 30 52 
   3.47 -6 38 46 
  8/9 3.44 -10 46 46 
   3.31 -4 42 32 
  9 3.54 -2 48 48 
Posterior Inferior Parietal Cortex 252 39 3.93 -40 -64 34 
 24	  
   3.91 -42 -58 26 
MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute; BA= Brodmann's Area;  PFC = Prefrontal Cortex;  
dl = Dorsolateral; dm = Dorsomedial; vl = Ventrolateral; vm = Ventromedial 	  
	  
Fig.	  4.	  Neural	  regions	  that	  were	  sensitive	  (i.e.,	  rebound	  in	  BOLD	  response	  for	  novel	  repetition	  versus	  identical	  repetition)	  to	  A)	  changes	  in	  visual	  perspective,	  or	  B)	  adopting	  a	  novel	  episodic	  counterfactual	  simulation.	  
	  
Fig.	  5.	  Common	  neural	  regions	  that	  were	  sensitive	  to	  changes	  in	  visual	  perspective	  and	  adopting	  a	  novel	  episodic	  counterfactual	  simulation.	  
3.1.4.	  Precuneus	  ROI	  Analysis:	  Constructing	  Alternative	  Versions	  of	  the	  Past	  	  Targeted	  central	  precuneus	  ROI	  analysis	  revealed	  that	  this	  region	  also	  contributed	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  novel	  visual	  perspectives.	  There	  was	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  trial	  within	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precuneus,	  F	  (2,56)	  =	  3.49,	  p	  =	  .044,	  ηp2	  =	  .11	  which	  was	  reflected	  by	  a	  basic	  repetition	  suppression	  effect	  for	  initial	  trials	  versus	  identical	  repeated	  retrieval	  trials,	  p	  =	  .041,	  and	  a	  rebound	  in	  the	  BOLD	  response	  when	  we	  varied	  the	  visual	  perspective	  of	  memories	  by	  asking	  participants	  to	  adopt	  a	  novel	  visual	  perspective	  on	  repeated	  retrieval	  trials,	  p	  =	  .013	  (see	  Fig.	  6).	  Critically,	  there	  was	  no	  main	  effect	  or	  interaction	  with	  the	  particular	  visual	  perspective	  taken,	  suggesting	  that	  adaptation	  effects	  in	  the	  precuneus	  were	  similar	  irrespective	  of	  whether	  an	  own	  eyes	  or	  observer	  perspective	  was	  adopted.	  To	  examine	  whether	  adopting	  a	  novel	  episodic	  counterfactual	  simulation	  led	  to	  a	  similar	  rebound	  in	  central	  precuneus	  we	  directly	  compared	  identical	  repeated	  trials	  with	  novel	  counterfactual	  trials,	  collapsed	  across	  perspective.	  The	  pattern	  for	  the	  novel	  counterfactual	  (M	  =	  .27,	  SD	  =	  .27)	  compared	  to	  identically	  repeated	  trials	  (M	  =	  .22,	  SD	  =	  .26)	  was	  in	  the	  same	  direction	  as	  above,	  but	  it	  did	  not	  reach	  significance,	  t	  (28)	  =	  1.46,	  p	  =.08,	  d	  =	  .27.	  Thus,	  the	  pattern	  of	  repetition	  suppression	  findings	  suggest	  that	  precuneus	  contributes	  to	  the	  ability	  to	  construct	  alternative	  versions	  of	  the	  past,	  particularly	  when	  adopting	  a	  novel	  visual	  perspective.	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Fig.	  6.	  ROI	  analysis	  in	  the	  precuneus	  revealed	  fMRI	  adaptation	  effects	  reflecting	  sensitivity	  to	  changes	  in	  visual	  perspective	  during	  AM	  retrieval,	  irrespective	  of	  whether	  an	  own	  eyes	  or	  observer	  perspective	  was	  adopted.	  One-­‐tailed	  p-­‐values	  are	  shown.	  Error	  bars	  reflect	  the	  within-­‐subject	  95%	  confidence	  interval.	  
4.1.	  Discussion	  Our	  findings	  reveal	  for	  the	  first	  time	  the	  neural	  regions	  that	  are	  sensitive	  to	  constructing	  alternative	  versions	  of	  the	  veridical	  and	  counterfactual	  past.	  Using	  an	  fMRI	  adaptation	  design,	  we	  show	  that	  similar	  neural	  regions	  that	  contribute	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  novel	  episodic	  counterfactual	  simulations	  support	  the	  reconstruction	  of	  memories	  from	  novel	  visual	  perspectives.	  Importantly,	  this	  pattern	  also	  overlapped	  with	  neural	  regions	  that	  are	  typically	  more	  engaged	  during	  episodic	  counterfactual	  simulations	  than	  veridical	  AM	  retrieval.	  Taken	  together,	  these	  results	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  constructive	  episodic	  simulation	  hypothesis,	  which	  maintains	  that	  both	  remembering	  and	  imagining	  are	  supported	  by	  similar	  constructive	  processes	  that	  can	  modify	  the	  veridical	  past	  and	  create	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novel	  scenarios	  of	  plausible	  past	  events	  that	  could	  have	  occurred	  (Schacter	  &	  Addis,	  2007).	  	  Previous	  research	  has	  shown	  that	  memory	  and	  episodic	  simulations	  are	  strongly	  related,	  as	  indicated	  by	  extensive	  overlap	  in	  their	  neural	  correlates	  (Benoit	  &	  Schacter,	  2015;	  Schacter,	  et	  al.,	  2015).	  However,	  episodic	  simulation	  typically	  involves	  greater	  constructive	  memory	  processes	  than	  remembering	  because	  it	  places	  more	  demands	  on	  recombination	  processes	  that	  enable	  episodic	  memory	  details	  to	  be	  reorganized	  in	  novel	  ways	  (Benoit	  &	  Schacter,	  2015;	  Schacter	  &	  Addis,	  2007).	  Manipulating	  the	  different	  ways	  that	  we	  can	  retrieve	  the	  past,	  such	  as	  adopting	  novel	  visual	  perspectives,	  however,	  likely	  involves	  additional	  constructive	  processes	  during	  remembering	  that	  would	  minimize	  differences	  between	  memory	  and	  imagination	  (McDermott,	  et	  al.,	  2016).	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  neural	  differences	  between	  the	  imagined	  and	  veridical	  past	  can	  be	  minimized	  when	  fewer	  demands	  are	  placed	  on	  constructive	  processes	  during	  imagination	  (De	  Brigard,	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  These	  ideas	  dovetail	  with	  the	  current	  findings	  of	  a	  similar	  pattern	  of	  neural	  activity	  when	  adopting	  a	  novel	  visual	  perspective	  during	  AM	  retrieval	  and	  a	  novel	  counterfactual	  simulation,	  suggesting	  that	  when	  constructive	  demands	  are	  increased	  retrieval	  of	  the	  past	  becomes	  more	  like	  imagination.	  Critically,	  here	  we	  also	  showed	  that	  general	  differences	  in	  task	  difficulty	  did	  not	  account	  for	  neural	  differences.	  These	  findings	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  increasing	  reconstructive	  demands	  during	  retrieval	  of	  AMs,	  by	  shifting	  visual	  perspective,	  recruits	  similar	  neural	  regions	  as	  those	  that	  support	  the	  transformation	  of	  memories	  into	  episodic	  counterfactual	  simulations.	  	  Adopting	  a	  novel	  visual	  perspective	  during	  AM	  retrieval	  led	  to	  similar	  fMRI	  adaptation	  effects	  compared	  with	  novel	  episodic	  counterfactual	  simulations	  in	  left	  inferior	  parietal	  cortex,	  ventrolateral	  PFC,	  and	  dorsomedial	  PFC.	  Additionally,	  a	  targeted	  ROI	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analysis	  suggested	  that	  precuneus	  also	  contributed	  to	  adopting	  novel	  visual	  perspectives,	  but	  the	  pattern	  of	  adaptation	  effects	  was	  less	  strong	  when	  adopting	  novel	  episodic	  counterfactual	  simulations.	  A	  recent	  meta-­‐analysis	  found	  that	  inferior	  parietal,	  dorsomedial	  PFC	  and	  precuneus	  were	  all	  engaged	  to	  a	  greater	  extent	  during	  episodic	  simulation	  than	  AM	  retrieval	  (Benoit	  &	  Schacter,	  2015).	  Additionally,	  neuropsychological	  evidence	  has	  suggested	  that	  PFC	  is	  more	  crucial	  to	  episodic	  simulation	  than	  AM	  retrieval	  (Berryhill	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  de	  Vito,	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  For	  example,	  patients	  with	  unilateral	  lesions	  to	  the	  PFC	  are	  impaired	  on	  flexibly	  recombining	  elements	  of	  past	  experiences	  to	  construct	  episodic	  simulations,	  despite	  an	  intact	  ability	  to	  remember	  the	  veridical	  past	  (Berryhill,	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  Here	  we	  show	  that	  manipulating	  the	  visual	  perspective	  of	  AMs	  can	  also	  engage	  neural	  activity	  in	  regions	  that	  support	  constructive	  processes	  typically	  engaged	  by	  simulation.	  	  	  Another	  explanation	  of	  our	  findings	  could	  be	  that	  episodic	  counterfactual	  simulations	  are	  simply	  more	  similar	  to	  AM	  retrieval	  than	  future	  oriented	  episodic	  simulations	  (e.g.,	  De	  Brigard	  et	  al.,	  2013),	  since	  both	  AM	  retrieval	  and	  episodic	  counterfactual	  simulations	  are	  centered	  on	  the	  past	  and	  necessarily	  more	  constrained	  than	  the	  open-­‐ended	  future.	  While	  this	  may	  be	  true	  to	  a	  certain	  extent,	  we	  do	  not	  think	  that	  it	  could	  easily	  explain	  the	  current	  findings,	  because	  we	  found	  that	  regions	  in	  the	  left	  posterior	  parietal	  and	  frontal	  cortices	  were	  recruited	  depending	  upon	  the	  level	  of	  constructive	  demands	  rather	  than	  the	  autobiographical	  or	  counterfactual	  nature	  of	  the	  task.	  Understanding	  how	  the	  flexible	  restructuring	  of	  the	  constrained	  past	  compares	  with	  imagining	  the	  open-­‐ended	  future,	  as	  well	  as	  better	  understanding	  the	  link	  between	  AM	  retrieval	  and	  episodic	  counterfactual	  simulation,	  are	  important	  areas	  for	  future	  research	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(De	  Brigard	  et	  al.,	  2015;	  Schacter,	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Schacter,	  et	  al.,	  2015).	  One	  reason	  why	  adopting	  a	  novel	  visual	  perspective	  may	  recruit	  similar	  neural	  processes	  as	  those	  involved	  in	  episodic	  simulation	  is	  because	  both	  could	  involve	  the	  manipulation	  of	  mental	  images	  in	  the	  service	  of	  constructing	  a	  novel	  scenario.	  According	  to	  a	  prominent	  neural	  model	  of	  spatial	  memory	  and	  imagery,	  egocentric	  frameworks	  generated	  during	  retrieval	  from	  long-­‐term	  memory	  within	  the	  posterior	  parietal	  cortex,	  and,	  in	  particular,	  the	  precuneus,	  can	  be	  manipulated	  and	  updated	  when	  people	  imagine	  the	  possible	  movements	  they	  can	  make	  within	  the	  remembered	  scene	  (Byrne	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  Supporting	  this	  model,	  recent	  evidence	  has	  shown	  that	  precuneus	  and	  lateral	  parietal	  cortices	  are	  recruited	  during	  imagined	  changes	  in	  self-­‐location	  in	  space	  (Dhindsa,	  et	  al.,	  2014;	  Lambrey	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  St.	  Jacques	  et	  al.	  (2017)	  recently	  demonstrated	  that	  precuneus	  and	  inferior	  parietal	  cortices,	  as	  well	  as	  ventrolateral	  PFC,	  contributed	  to	  actively	  shifting	  the	  visual	  perspective	  of	  AMs	  during	  retrieval.	  Moreover,	  St.	  Jacques	  et	  al.	  (2017)	  found	  that	  neural	  recruitment	  in	  the	  precuneus	  also	  predicted	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  shifting	  visual	  perspective	  modified	  the	  phenomenological	  properties	  of	  memories,	  suggesting	  that	  memories	  were	  reshaped	  when	  adopting	  a	  novel	  visual	  perspective.	  Here,	  utilizing	  an	  entirely	  within-­‐subject	  design,	  we	  show	  that	  overlapping	  regions	  within	  the	  left	  posterior	  parietal	  cortex	  and	  ventrolateral	  PFC	  support	  the	  construction	  of	  alternative	  visual	  perspectives	  during	  AM	  retrieval	  and	  novel	  episodic	  counterfactual	  simulations.	  	  	  The	  current	  findings	  could	  also	  provide	  insight	  into	  why	  previous	  functional	  neuroimaging	  studies	  of	  AM	  retrieval	  have	  sometimes	  found	  inconsistent	  results	  concerning	  the	  involvement	  of	  the	  precuneus	  when	  adopting	  a	  particular	  visual	  perspective.	  For	  example,	  during	  AM	  retrieval	  precuneus	  has	  been	  linked	  to	  adopting	  an	  own	  eyes	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perspective	  (Freton,	  et	  al.,	  2014),	  an	  observer	  visual	  perspective	  (Grol,	  et	  al.,	  2017),	  or	  to	  both	  own	  eyes	  and	  observer	  (Eich,	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  St.	  Jacques	  et	  al.	  (2017)	  showed	  that	  the	  precuneus	  was	  engaged	  more	  when	  adopting	  a	  novel	  visual	  perspective	  than	  maintaining	  an	  identical	  one	  during	  AM	  retrieval.	  However,	  one	  limitation	  of	  this	  study	  was	  that	  shifts	  in	  visual	  perspective	  were	  examined	  in	  one	  direction	  only—from	  own	  eyes	  to	  observer.	  	  Here	  we	  replicate	  the	  findings	  from	  St.	  Jacques	  et	  al.	  (2017)	  in	  a	  different	  group	  of	  participants,	  and	  further	  reveal	  that	  the	  precuneus	  is	  engaged	  irrespective	  of	  the	  direction	  of	  perspective	  shifting	  (i.e.,	  from	  both	  own	  eyes	  to	  observer	  AND	  observer	  to	  own	  eyes).	  Other	  research	  has	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  precuneus	  contributes	  more	  widely	  to	  mental	  imagery	  and	  self-­‐referential	  processes	  (for	  review	  see	  Cavanna	  &	  Trimble,	  2006),	  which	  may	  support	  the	  construction	  of	  complex	  and	  realistic	  scenes	  of	  the	  personal	  past	  (Hassabis	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Summerfield	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Together	  these	  findings	  suggest	  that	  precuneus	  does	  not	  preferentially	  support	  own	  eyes	  or	  observer	  perspectives	  during	  AM	  retrieval,	  but	  instead	  provides	  a	  particular	  perspective	  from	  which	  to	  inspect	  and	  manipulate	  the	  mental	  images	  that	  arise	  during	  remembering,	  thereby	  contributing	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  past	  events.	  The	  ventromedial	  PFC	  was	  sensitive	  to	  changes	  in	  visual	  perspective	  during	  AM	  retrieval,	  but	  not	  when	  changing	  the	  counterfactual	  nature	  of	  memories.	  Ventromedial	  PFC	  is	  frequently	  involved	  in	  AM	  retrieval	  and	  has	  been	  linked	  to	  self-­‐referential	  and	  emotional	  aspects	  of	  memory	  recollection	  (Cabeza	  &	  St	  Jacques,	  2007;	  Svoboda	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  Recently,	  Lin	  et	  al.	  (2016)	  showed	  that	  ventromedial	  PFC	  adds	  a	  subjective	  sense	  of	  personal	  emotional	  value	  to	  the	  individual	  elements	  of	  memories.	  Similarly,	  during	  episodic	  simulation	  ventromedial	  PFC	  contributes	  to	  the	  integration	  of	  knowledge	  and	  affective	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value	  (Benoit	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  Both	  visual	  perspective	  and	  episodic	  counterfactual	  simulation	  manipulations	  are	  capable	  of	  altering	  the	  affective	  quality	  of	  memories	  (Berntsen	  &	  Rubin,	  2006;	  De	  Brigard	  &	  Giovanello,	  2012;	  St	  Jacques,	  et	  al.,	  2017),	  and	  such	  manipulations	  may	  result	  in	  greater	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  ventromedial	  PFC	  when	  adopting	  novel	  visual	  perspectives	  and	  counterfactual	  simulations.	  However,	  in	  the	  current	  study	  we	  directly	  instructed	  participants	  not	  to	  change	  the	  emotion	  of	  the	  event	  when	  constructing	  a	  novel	  episodic	  simulation,	  which	  could	  explain	  the	  lack	  of	  adaptation	  effects	  in	  the	  ventromedial	  PFC	  found	  here.	  Future	  research	  should	  examine	  how	  adopting	  a	  novel	  visual	  perspective	  affects	  the	  value	  or	  personal	  significance	  attached	  to	  individual	  elements	  comprising	  a	  particular	  AM.	  The	  current	  findings	  present	  novel	  evidence	  that	  reshaping	  of	  the	  veridical	  past	  recruits	  common	  neural	  mechanisms	  that	  align	  memory	  with	  imagination.	  In	  our	  previous	  research,	  we	  showed	  that	  actively	  shifting	  the	  visual	  perspective	  of	  AMs	  biased	  the	  phenomenological	  properties	  of	  memories	  and	  we	  delineated	  the	  neural	  mechanisms	  during	  retrieval	  that	  contributed	  to	  this	  reshaping	  of	  memories	  (St	  Jacques,	  et	  al.,	  2017).	  Here	  we	  revealed	  that	  such	  retrieval-­‐related	  changes	  in	  memories	  recruit	  the	  same	  neural	  correlates	  that	  enable	  the	  construction	  of	  hypothetical	  events	  that	  could	  have	  occurred	  in	  the	  past.	  A	  number	  of	  behavioural	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  visual	  perspective	  influences	  the	  content	  and	  phenomenology	  of	  AMs	  (Berntsen	  &	  Rubin,	  2006;	  Robinson	  &	  Swanson,	  1993;	  Vella	  &	  Moulds,	  2014),	  and	  can	  also	  lead	  to	  persistent	  changes	  in	  memories	  (Butler,	  et	  al.,	  2016;	  Sekiguchi	  &	  Nonaka,	  2014;	  St	  Jacques	  &	  Schacter,	  2013).	  Marcotti	  &	  St.	  Jacques	  (2017)	  recently	  found	  that	  shifting	  from	  an	  own	  eyes	  to	  an	  observer	  perspective	  during	  retrieval	  also	  reduces	  the	  accuracy	  of	  subsequent	  memories	  (also	  see	  Bagri	  &	  Jones,	  2009;	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St.	  Jacques	  &	  Schacter,	  2013).	  Similarly,	  constructing	  counterfactual	  simulations	  of	  events	  can	  lead	  to	  subsequent	  memory	  distortions	  (Gerlach	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  An	  important	  avenue	  for	  future	  research	  will	  be	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  restructuring	  the	  past,	  namely	  changing	  one’s	  visual	  perspective	  during	  retrieval	  and	  simulating	  plausible	  alternatives	  to	  past	  events,	  may	  alter	  and	  even	  distort	  memories	  from	  the	  personal	  past.	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Supplemental	  Figure	  1.	  Percent	  signal	  change	  showing	  no	  differences	  in	  high	  difficulty	  versus	  low	  difficulty	  trials,	  based	  on	  a	  median	  split	  on	  subjective	  ratings,	  in	  ROIs	  that	  were	  recruited	  more	  in	  the	  episodic	  counterfactual	  simulation	  versus	  autobiographical	  memory	  (AM)	  retrieval	  task.	  Error	  bars	  reflect	  the	  within-­‐subject	  95%	  confidence	  interval.	  
